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Game Theory Evolving : A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction View Larger Image

Game Theory Evolving : A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction

Gintis, Herbert M. (Author)

ISBN-10: 0691009430
ISBN-13: 9780691009438

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Author Affiliation
Herbert Gintis is Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.BIH Author Biography
Herbert Gintis is Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and coauthor (with Samuel Bowles) of Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought. "Mathematically rigorous, computationally adroit, rich in illuminating problems, and engagingly written, Game Theory Evolving will be invaluable to students and researchers across the social sciences."Back Cover Copy
"Mathematically rigorous, computationally adroit, rich in illuminating problems, and engagingly written, Game Theory Evolving will be invaluable to students and researchers across the social sciences."--Joshua M. Epstein, The Brookings Institution and Santa Fe Institute "Herb Gintis weaves classical game theory together with recent work in experimental economics, biology, evolutionary game theory, and behavioral economics. His book has something new, possibly something to argue with, but always something intriguing, for everyone."--Larry Samuelson,University of Wisconsin "For anyone interested in game theory as a conceptual framework for investigating and thinking about strategic behavior in the social world, broadly interpreted, this book is a must reference work. Herb Gintis is to be congratulated for integrating a large literature on theory, evolution, experimental and field observations into an accessible treatise."--Vernon Smith,University of Arizona "There is a great need for a problem book in game theory, and Gintis is correct to emphasize that learning game theory requires the solving of problems."--Michael Suk-Young Chwe, New York University "Simply to have all this material in one place is refreshing and a big step forward. Gintis is careful on technical detail and clearly loves these models."--Colin Camerer,California Institute of Technology "Game Theory Evolvingis the most up-to-date textbook in game theory on the market. Gintis covers an extraordinary range of topics, including some of the most recent developments in theory, with both stylistic verve and mathematical rigor. More importantly, he shows how the theory illuminates a great variety of real-world situations that both students and professors can relate to."---H. Peyton Young, The Johns Hopkins University and The Brookings InstitutionBack Cover Copy
The study of strategic action (game theory) is moving from a formal science of rational behavior to an evolutionary tool kit for studying behavior in a broad array of social settings. In this problem-oriented introduction to the field, Herbert Gintis exposes students to the techniques and applications of game theory through a wealth of sophisticated and surprisingly fun-to-solve problems involving human (and even animal) behavior. Game Theory Evolving is innovative in several ways. First, it reflects game theory's expansion into such areas as cooperation in teams, networks, the evolution and diffusion of preferences, the connection between biology and economics, artificial life simulations, and experimental economics. Second, the book-recognizing that students learn by doing and that most game theory texts are weak on problems-is organized around problems, and introduces principles through practice. Finally, the quality of the problems is simply unsurpassed, and each chapter provides a study plan for instructors interested in teaching evolutionary game theory. Reflecting the growing consensus that, in many important contexts outside of anonymous markets, human behavior is not well described by classical "rationality." Gintis shows students how to apply game theory to model how people behave in ways that reflect the special nature of human sociality and individuality. This book is perfect for upper undergraduate and graduate economics courses as well as a terrific introduction for ambitious do-it-yourselfers throughout the behavioral sciences.Review Quote
Gintis has wholeheartedly embraced the evolutionary approach to games. . .The author is an accomplished economist raised in the classical mold, and his background shown in many aspects of the book . . . He himself has important things to say . . . .
"Mathematically rigorous, computationally adroit, rich in illuminating problems, and engagingly written, Game Theory Evolving will be invaluable to students and researchers across the social sciences."--Joshua M. Epstein, The Brookings Institution and Santa Fe InstituteP"Herb Gintis weaves classical game theory together with recent work in experimental economics, biology, evolutionary game theory, and behavioral economics. His book has something new, possibly something to argue with, but always something intriguing, for everyone."--Larry Samuelson, "University of Wisconsin"P"For anyone interested in game theory as a conceptual framework for investigating and thinking about strategic behavior in the social world, broadly interpreted, this book is a must reference work. Herb Gintis is to be congratulated for integrating a large literature on theory, evolution, experimental and field observations into an accessible treatise."--Vernon Smith, "University of Arizona"P"There is a great need for a problem book in game theory, and Gintis is correct to emphasize that learning game theory requires the solving of problems."--Michael Suk-Young Chwe, New York UniversityP"Simply to have all this material in one place is refreshing and a big step forward. Gintis is careful on technical detail and clearly loves these models."--Colin Camerer, "California Institute of Technology"P""Game Theory Evolving" is the most up-to-date textbook in game theory on the market. Gintis covers an extraordinary range of topics, including some of the most recent developments in theory, with both stylistic verve and mathematical rigor. More importantly, he shows how the theory illuminates a great variety ofreal-world situations that both students and professors can relate to."---H. Peyton Young, The Johns Hopkins University and The Brookings InstitutionUnpublished Endorsement
Game Theory Evolving is the most up-to-date textbook in game theory on the market. Gintis covers an extraordinary range of topics, including some of the most recent developments in theory, with both stylistic verve and mathematical rigor. More importantly, he shows how the theory illuminates a great variety of real-world situations that both students and professors can relate to.
Prefacep. xxi
Suggestions for Instructorsp. xxx
Concepts and Problems
Game Theory: A Lexicon for Strategic Interactionp. 3
Introductionp. 3
Big Monkey and Little Monkeyp. 3
The Extensive Form Gamep. 10
The Normal Form Gamep. 12
Nash Equilibriump. 12
Reviewing the Terminologyp. 14
Leading from Strength: Eliminating Dominated Strategiesp. 15
Introductionp. 15
Dominant and Dominated Strategiesp. 15
Backward Induction: Pruning the Game Treep. 16
Eliminating Dominated Strategiesp. 18
Concepts and Definitionsp. 18
The PrisOner's Dilemmap. 19
An Armaments Gamep. 20
Second-Price Auctionp. 20
The Landlord and the Eviction Noticep. 21
Hagar's Battlesp. 21
An Increasing-Bid Auctionp. 21
The Debtor and His Creditorsp. 22
Football Strategyp. 22
A Military Strategy Gamep. 22
Strategic Votingp. 23
Eliminating Dominated Strategies ad Absurdump. 23
Poker with Bluffingp. 24
The Centipede Gamep. 25
Playing It Straight: Pure Strategy Nash Equilibriap. 27
Introductionp. 27
Pure Coordination Gamesp. 28
Competition on Main Streetp. 28
A Pure Coordination Game'p. 29
Twin Sistersp. 29
Variations on Duopolyp. 30
The Tobacco Marketp. 31
Price-Matching as Tacit Collusionp. 31
The Klingons and the Snarksp. 32
Chess-The Trivial Pastimep. 33
The Samaritan's Dilemmap. 33
The Rotten Kid Theoremp. 34
The Illogic of Conflict Escalationp. 35
How to Value Lotteriesp. 36
Payoffs in Games Where Nature Movesp. 37
Nature in Action: No-Draw, High-Low Pokerp. 38
The Expected Utility Principlep. 41
Buying Fire Insurancep. 42
Neoclassical Economics and Game Theoryp. 43
Markets as Disciplining Devices: Allied Widgetsp. 46
The Truth Gamep. 51
The Shopper and the Fish Merchantp. 52
Fathers and Sonsp. 53
The Women of Sevitanp. 53
Catching 'em Off Guard: Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibriap. 54
Introductionp. 54
Mixed Strategies: Basic Definitionsp. 55
The Fundamental Theoremp. 56
Solving for Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibriap. 57
Reviewing the Terminologyp. 58
Big Monkey and Little Monkey Revisitedp. 59
Dominance Revisitedp. 59
Competition on Main Street Revisitedp. 59
Battle of the Sexesp. 60
Throwing Fingersp. 60
One-Card Two-Round Poker with Bluffingp. 60
Trust in NeTworksp. 62
Behavioral Strategies in Extensive Form Gamesp. 63
Lions and Antelopep. 65
The Santa Fe Barp. 66
Orange-Throat, Blue-Throat, and Yellow- Striped Lizardsp. 67
Sex Ratios as Nash Equilibriap. 68
Tennis Strategyp. 69
A Mating Gamep. 70
Preservation of Ecology Gamep. 71
Hard Lovep. 71
Coordination Failurep. 72
Advertising Gamep. 72
ColOnel Blotto Gamep. 72
Number Guessing Gamep. 73
Target Selectionp. 73
A Reconnaissance Gamep. 74
Attack on Hidden Objectp. 74
Two-Person Zero-Sum Gamesp. 75
An Introduction to Forward Inductionp. 76
Mutual Monitoring in a Partnershipp. 77
Mutual Monitoring in Teamsp. 78
Altruism(?) in Bird Flocksp. 79
Robin Hood and Little Johnp. 80
The Motorist's Dilemmap. 80
Family Politicsp. 81
Frankie and Johnnyp. 81
A Card Gamep. 82
Cheater-Inspectorp. 82
The Groucho Marx Gamep. 82
Real Men Don't Eat Quichep. 84
The Vindication of the Hawkp. 84
Correlated Equilibriap. 85
Poker with Bluffing Revisitedp. 87
Equivalence of Behavioral and Mixed Strategiesp. 87
Moving through the Game Tree: Subgames, Incredible Threats, and Trembling Handsp. 90
Introductionp. 90
Subgame Perfectionp. 92
Stackelberg Leadershipp. 95
The Subway Entry Deterrence Gamep. 96
The Dr. Strangelove Gamep. 96
The Rubinstein Bargaining Modelp. 97
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.
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Edition: 2000
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Binding: Trade Paper
Pages: 528
Size: 6.75" wide x 10.00" long x 1.25" tall
Weight: 2.05 lbs.
Language: English

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