Most sophisticated theoretical works on corporate governance has focused on advanced market economies. This edited volume focuses on the reverse concern: what, if anything, do the reform experiences of transition countries teach about corporate governance theory more generally?
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| Introduction | |
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| Framework | |
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| What Is Good Corporate Governance? | |
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| The Elements of Good Corporate Governance: Law | |
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| Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies | |
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| The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right | |
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| The Elements of Good Corporate Governance: Owners and Managers | |
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| Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong? | |
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| Why Ownership Matters: Entrepreneurship and the Restructuring of Enterprises in Central Europe | |
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| The Elements of Good Corporate Governance: Stock Markets | |
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| Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Lessons from the Prewar Japanese Cotton Textile Industry | |
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| Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure | |
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| The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements? | |
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| What Does Transition Contribute to Theory? | |
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| Conclusion: The Unexplored Role of Initial Conditions | |
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| List of Contributors | |
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| Index | |
